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ARGUMENT 
A. The Listing Agreement Unambiguously Requires The Payment Of 
Commissions On Any And AH Lease Renewals. 
Zions Holding Company (hereinafter "Zions") correctly states that Tom Heal 
Commercial Real Estate, Inc.'s (hereinafter "Heal") position is that the contract 
(hereinafter "Listing Agreement") between Zions and Heal is unambiguous. Brief of 
Appellees at 13. Heal again states that its interpretation of the Listing Agreement is the 
only reasonable unambiguous reading of the Listing Agreement and the only 
interpretation that gives full affect to all of the words as plainly written in the Listing 
Agreement and as required by the Utah Supreme Court. See Fairbourne Commercial v. 
America Housing, 94 P.3d 292 (Utah 2004). Although Zions properly brings to this 
Court's attention the proper analysis for interpreting the Listing Agreement, Zions gives 
no support as to why the district court's application of that analysis is correct. The correct 
application of the steps outlined in the district court's decision can only lead to the 
conclusion that Zions is liable to Heal for commissions on all lease renewals of the initial 
lease. 
Zions argues that Heal's interpretation of the Listing Agreement is flawed because 
"it fails to harmonize appropriately paragraphs 2 and 3 in the Agreement." Zion's then 
states that Utah case law requires a court to "consider each contract provision . . . in 
relation to all of the other with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." 
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Green River Canal Co., v. Thayne, 84 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Utah 2003). Heal agrees with 
Zions that such an interpretation should occur but asserts that the district court's 
interpretation of the Listing Agreement, although attempting to comply with this standard, 
fails to reasonably interpret the Listing Agreement, ignores the plain meaning, ignores 
significant portions of the Listing Agreement and thus in effect, rewrites the agreement. 
Again, for the convenience of the Court, the paragraphs in question, paragraphs 2 and 3 
of the Listing Agreement, provide as follows: 
2. BROKERAGE FEE. If, during the Listing Period, the Company, 
the Seller's Agent, The Seller, another real estate agent, or anyone else 
locates a party who is ready, willing and able to buy, lease, or exchange 
(collectively referred to as "acquire") the Property, or any part thereof, at 
the listing price and terms stated on the attached property data information 
form, or any other price and terms to which the Seller may agree in writing, 
the Seller agrees to pay to the Company a brokerage fee in the amount of 
six percent (6%) of such acquisition price. In the case of a lease of the 
Property, the commission shall be the commission percentage times the 
aggregate of all lease payments during the full term of the lease. Seller 
shall be obligated to pay a commission on [sic] of six percent (6%) on any 
and all lease renewals at the time of such renewals. The brokerage fee, 
unless otherwise agreed in writing by the Seller and the Company, shall be 
due and payable on (a) the date of closing of the acquisition of the Property; 
or (b) 50% due and payable when the lease is signed, and 50% due and 
payable upon the first day of the lease commencement; or (c) the first day of 
the lease renewal commencement; or (d) the date the option is signed. 
3. PROTECTION PERIOD. If within twenty-four months after 
the termination or expiration of this Listing Agreement, the Property is 
acquired by a party to whom the Property was offered or shown by the 
Company, the Seller's Agent, the Seller, another real estate agent, or by any 
other person during the Listing Period, the Seller agrees to pay to the 
Company the brokerage fee stated in Section 2 unless the Seller is obligated 
to pay a brokerage fee on such acquisition to another brokerage pursuant to 
another valid listing contract entered into after the expiration or termination 
date of this Listing Agreement. 
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Listing Agreement paragraphs 2 and 3. 
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Listing Agreement are in harmony as written in the 
agreement and provide for two independent alternative scenarios. When reading these 
two paragraphs it is important to note that both paragraphs begin with the word "if. The 
word " i f is commonly defined as meaning "in the event that: allowing that: [or] on 
condition that." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 598 (1984). In interpreting 
these two paragraphs the district court ignores the affect of the "ifs." See Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusions of Law If 6. Remembering that the word " i f 
means "in the event thaf or "on condition thaf and using this meaning when reading 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Listing Agreement, it is clear that these paragraphs apply only 
when certain conditions or events occur. 
Paragraph 2 applies "[in the event that] during the Listing Period, [Heal] locates a 
party who is ready, willing and able to buy, lease, or exchange (collectively referred to as 
"acquire") the Property, or any part thereof, at the listing price and terms stated on the 
attached property data information form, or any other price and terms to which the Seller 
may agree in writing . . . " Listing Agreement Paragraph 2. Reading paragraph 2 with 
emphasis placed on the " i f indicates that paragraph 2 applies "in the event thaf Heal 
finds a lessee during the Listing Period (the Listing Period is defined in the Listing 
Agreement) and said lessee leases the property during the Listing Period. The district 
court's findings of fact, paragraphs 2, 4 and 7, indicate Heal located a lessee of the 
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property during the Listing Period, and the lessee entered into a lease during the Listing 
Period. Because Heal located a "ready, willing and able" lessee during the Listing Period, 
all of paragraph 2 of the Listing Agreement applies to that transaction, including the 
sentence stating "[s]eller shall be obligated to pay a commission on [sic] of six percent 
(6%) on any and all lease renewals at the time of such renewals." The district court's 
interpretation gives no affect to this sentence. 
Paragraph 3 of the Listing Agreement applies "[in the event that] within twenty-
four months after the termination or expiration of this Listing Agreement, the Property is 
acquired by a party to whom the Property was offered or shown by [Heal] during the 
Listing Period, the Seller agrees to pay to [Heal] the brokerage fee stated in Section 2 . . . " 
This event or condition did not occur because Heal had already provided a ready, willing 
and able" lessee during the Listing Period. In fact, because Heal located a lessee during 
the Listing Period and that lessee leased the property duriag the Listing Period, the event 
or condition in paragraph 3 of the Listing Agreement was rendered moot. Therefore, 
paragraphs 2 and 3 are in harmony because the paragraphs provide for two alternative 
independent scenarios, a contractual "fork in the road" that provides for harmonious 
interpretation of the Listing Agreement no matter what path Heal and the lessee travel on 
toward the lease of the property. 
Zions is apparently confused about the fact that "[n]owhere in his Brief does Heal 
address the interrelationship of and specific reference to Section 2. Brokerage Fee in 
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Section 3 of the Agreement, (3. Protection Period. "...Seller agrees to pay to the 
Company the brokerage fee stated in Section 2...") with the payment of a commission." 
Appellee's brief at 15 (emphasis in original). Heal addresses the "interrelationship of and 
specific reference to Section 2" in Section 3, consistent with the plain meaning of the 
Listing Agreement, by stating that paragraph 2 simply provides instruction as to the 
commissions to be paid Heal in the event that the triggering event of paragraph 3 occurs. 
In this case the triggering event did not occur because the lessee located by Heal leased 
the property during the Listing Period, not during the Protection Period and therefore 
paragraph 2 provides all of the information needed to determine the brokerage fees owed 
to Heal. The district court erroneously attempted to harmonize these paragraphs, in 
essence overanalyzing the Listing Agreement under a condition that did not occur and 
created an interpretation of the agreement that is not in harmony with the plain language 
of the agreement. 
Assuming arguendo that paragraph 3 does in some way apply to the factual 
scenario between Heal and Zions, and harmonization of the paragraphs is necessary, Heal 
offers the only reasonable reading of paragraph 3. The reference to paragraph 2 in 
paragraph 3 of the Listing Agreement simply refers the reader to paragraph 2 to determine 
the amount and timing of the brokerage fees due to Heal. In the event that Paragraph 3 
applies, the Listing Agreement plainly states: "the Seller agrees to pay to the Company 
the brokerage fee stated in Section 2." Thus, a "harmonization" of paragraphs 2 and 3 
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can only lead to the conclusion that the brokerage fees are to be paid as outlined in 
paragraph 2 and paragraph 2 clearly calls for a commission on any and all lease renewals 
regardless of when such renewal occurs. 
Thus, only two events can trigger the payment of brokerage fees under the Listing 
Agreement: 1) a lease of the property during the Listing Period as outlined in paragraph 2; 
or 2) if a lease is not consummated during the Listing Period, a lease of the property 
occurs during the Protection Period by a lessee located b> Heal during the Listing Period 
as outlined in paragraph 3. The above two conditions are contractually harmonious, a 
virtual "fork in the road" when interpreting the Listing Agreement. In this case, Heal 
located a lessee during the Listing Period and the lessee leased the property during the 
Listing Period. Therefore, the condition for paragraph 2 1o apply occurred. Nonetheless, 
regardless of which of the above two scenarios occurs, the brokerage fees due to Heal are 
always controlled by paragraph 2 of the Listing Agreement and require the payment of 
fees on "any and all lease renewals." Zions is therefore liable to Heal for the 
commissions on the lease renewal entered into between Zions and the lessee located by 
Heal. 
B. Enforcing All Of The Terms Of Paragraph 2 Of The Listing Agreement 
Does Not Change The Bargain Between The Parties. 
Zions states that "Heal and the Amicus Curiae improperly request that this Court 
change the bargain entered into by the parties on the basis of supposed equitable 
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principles, i.e., that the parties' intent should be gleaned from and inserted into the 
Agreement by the Court based on the standard in the industry." Zions misunderstands 
Heal's argument. Heal's argument is simply that the bargain between the parties is 
plainly expressed in the Listing Agreement: "seller shall be obligated to pay a commission 
on [six] of six percent (6%) on any and all lease renewals at the time of such renewals." 
Listing Agreement Paragraph 2. Heal asserts that the amicus brief merely supports Heal's 
interpretation of the plain meaning of the Listing Agreement by explaining the plain 
meaning and industry wide purpose of a "Protection Period." The amicus brief, filed by 
the National and Utah Associations of Realtors, merely supports Heal's interpretation of 
the contract. 
Zions further states that the "Court cannot do for Heal what Heal himself failed to 
do." Heal did not fail to outline the parties' true intent in the body of the contract. The 
contract is clear and unambiguous and the district court should not be allowed to interpret 
it in a way that renders certain parts of the contract meaningless, especially given the 
"Utah Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement to (1) [fully] consider each provision 
and (2) 'ignore none.'" Appellee Brief at 15 (citing Fairbourne Commercial v. American 
Housing, 94 P.3d 292 (Utah 2004). The Listing Agreement specifically calls for a 
commission on "any and all lease renewals" and the district court's interpretation renders 
this phrase meaningless. The district court should not be allowed to do for Zions what 
Zions failed to do for itself. The parties were in equal bargaining position and by 
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interpreting the contract as it has the district court has rendered an unreasonable 
interpretation of the contract and in essence rewrote the agreement to include terms which 
neither party bargained for. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's interpretation of the Listing Agreement, although attempting to 
comply with Utah standards for interpreting contracts fails to reasonably interpret the 
contact, ignores the plain meaning of the contract, rewrites the contract and fails to fully 
consider each provision in the contact. A true harmonization of all of the terms of the 
contract can only lead to the conclusion that since Heal found a ready, able and willing 
lessee of the property during the Listing Period and said lessee entered into a lease with 
Zions during the Listing Period, Zions is liable to Heal for a commission on each and 
every lease renewal of the initial lease as provided in paragraph 2 of the Listing 
Agreement. 
DATED this 2*\ day of November, 2004 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Jeremy C. ftnk 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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